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Last modified on March 1, 2018


Others March 1, 2018

《UTokyo-UC Berkeley Strategic Partnership 》 Institute of Social Science Presents Special Lectures March 27(Tue) and 28(Wed), 2018.

Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo is pleased to welcome you to two lectures by Professor Leonardo R. Arriola (UC Berkeley) on March 27th and 28th.
These talks are part of the UTokyo-UC Berkeley Strategic Partnership, and will take place in the Hongo campus.

Leonardo R. Arriola is an associate professor of political science at University of California, Berkeley. His research focuses on democratization, governance, and violence in African countries. He has conducted field research in countries such as Ethiopia, Cameroon, and Kenya. He is author of Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns (Cambridge University Press 2013).

If you are interested in attending, we would appreciate your RSVP through the following link.

Lecture: "Can Democracy Survive in Africa?"

Date: March 27 (Tue) 17:30-19:00 (17:00 Open)
Venue: Room 549, Akamon General Research Building, Hongo Campus, University of Tokyo

Summary: The future of democracy in Africa remains uncertain. Poverty, violence, and ethnic diversity are widely considered among the most important factors in preventing the emergence of stable democracy in African countries. I present evidence from across the continent, including experimental data from Kenya, Ivory Coast, and Zambia, to show that many of these threats to democracy are exaggerated. I show that African voters are positively engaged in elections -- and behave like voters in other regions -- but it is the legacy of authoritarian rule that poses the greatest threat to democracy.

Lecture: "Elite Cooptation and Opposition Division in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes"
URL: http://utokyo.ucberkeley.jp/en/news_and_events/lecture_arriola4

Date: March 28 (Wed) 12:15-13:45 (11:45 Open)
Venue: Room 549, Akamon General Research Building, Hongo Campus, University of Tokyo

Summary: Elections in authoritarian regimes can serve as institutional tools that enable dictators to "divide and conquer" their opponents. We argue that incumbents strategically rotate cabinet appointments before elections to signal the likelihood that they will invite opposition politicians into government. This dynamic induces opposition forces to divide. Analyzing data on cabinet appointments in 36 African countries, we demonstrate that a greater rate of pre-electoral cabinet reshuffling is associated with a larger effective number of opposition candidates. Our findings suggest that autocratic incumbents can weaken opposition through this form of patronage cooptation even in the absence of electoral fraud or outright manipulation.

For more information, please contact: todaiberkeley@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp

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